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Abstract 
The principal aim of this paper is to present the problematic of the asymmetric 
power effect on public-private partnership. To do this we have mixed the works on 
PPP and those focusing on asymmetric power on commercial negotiation. This 
methodology allows us to determine the theoretical variables (in the form of 
hypothesis) which can be linked to the asymmetric power effect, on PPP 
negotiation. 
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1. Introduction 
Faced to increasingly investment needs and in an unfavorable global economic condition, 
budgetary resources become scarcer and more likely to not cover necessary expenses for 
sustained and sustainable economic growth. Therefore, to reduce the charge of the public sector, 
governments have begun, since the turn of the 80's, to rethink , firstly, their development 
strategies for their public sectors, and secondly to entrust some or all of the private sector 
(privatization ). This second alternative has taken various forms, ranging from the simple sale of 
some elements of public assets to the sale of public actions and concessions of public services.  
In other words, the recourse of the majority of governments to public-private partnerships 
is mainly due to the problems and difficulties known by the standard models of governance and 
the traditional modes of ownership (perfect private property, attenuated private property, 
communal property and the public property). Also, the relative failure of structural adjustment 
plans applied in most developing countries, namely the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Central 
Africa and the countries of Latin America forced the international financial institutions (like the 
International Monetary fund and World bank) to encourage governments to act in partnership 
with the local private sector and / or with abroad to burden-sharing and the expected gains of 
public investments. 
Theoretical arguments extolling the use of PPPs are multiple. For illustration and not 
exclusion we can cite the optimization of the cost / income, the distribution of risks between the 
public authority and the private operator, the retention by the public entity's strategic control of 
the service, and finally the gain whom benefits the public sector in dealing with the private 
sector. Interest in a State or a local authority is to "develop an economic infrastructure to ensure 
the development of a country, while reducing their debts and risks." 
 
Therefore, this new form of partnership has become more and more important in the 
development strategies of countries both developed and developing. For example, we can refer to 
statistics from the World Bank stating that between 2000 and 2010 more than 29 governments in 
Latin America and the Caribbean sponsored 688 infrastructure projects in partnership with the 
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private sector for a capital worth 191 billion of US dollar. Thus, during the same period, 17 
governments outside the countries of East Asia have implemented 908 infrastructure projects in 
the form of partnership with the private sector for a capital worth 154 billion of US dollar. 
 
In the case of Europe, the same observation prevailed because the PPP market, has 
known, in the last two decades, a remarkable boom. Indeed, the number of PPP project has 
increased from 80 in 2004 to 120 in 2005 to its maximum level of 135 in 2007 before declining to 
60 projects in 2012 and 65 in 2013. This decline was mainly due to the climate of pessimism that 
prevailed in the subprime post-crisis period in 2007. 
 
In Tunisia, the PPP, despite it being adopted as one of indirect forms of privatization, it 
remains far shy in terms of number (9 cases of partnerships) or in terms of invested capital 
volume or concerned services (these include road infrastructure projects, railways, public 
facilities, and hydrocarbons). Beyond the evolution of this type of partnership exists a plurality of 
advantages, of objectives and of mutual exchange of interests between the public sector and the 
private sector.  
However, it should be noted that, like any type of partnership, decisions will inevitably be 
taken after negotiations between the various parties and actors. Through these negotiations the 
stakeholders discuss, the optimal contract allowing them to sign a contract. 
In general, according to the stylized facts, the said negotiations take two forms: the integrative 
form or distributive. An integrative strategy refers to negotiations in which the focus is on non-
coercive tactics such as recommendations, requests or information exchanges. Nevertheless, 
Distributive strategy refers to a negotiation based on coercion such as the use of threats, 
promises, recourse to legal arguments (Frazier and Summers (1986), Fisher and Ury (1981); 
Pruitt, (1981); and Litterer Lewicki (1985)). 
Moreover, it should be noted that negotiations in the context of PPP are inherently 
different from negotiations resulting from the trade process. Indeed, commercial negotiation is a 
relationship between two private operators in which each one tries to maximize its own interests. 
The trade negotiation between two private actors generates some gains and losses on each of side 
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and leads finally to Pareto optimum (setting a consent price) that satisfies the buyer, and 
maximizes the seller   profit). As part of this relationship, despite the existence of asymmetry at 
the bargaining power, we can achieve a fair contract in which each of the contractual parties 
maximizes their utility function explicit. 
However, in the context of PPP, the relational schema between different stakeholders is 
much more complex. The said complexity, is due to the fact that the government (state) conducts 
a  succession of delegations through the appointment a person or group of people to negotiate, on 
its behalf, with the private partner. Therefore, more the delegations are multiple, more the 
informational distances and asymmetries are important. This, can probably, creates divergent 
interests between partners since the public partner defends public and collective interests while 
the private partner defends its proper private interests. This bargaining is characterized by the use 
of a series of distributive and integrative strategy of negotiation by both sides which continues 
until a Pareto optimum will take place leading to the maximization of individual gain of each 
part. 
In addition, in the context of a partnership contract negotiations, there is a set of 
constraints and problems facing the negotiators such as: the frequency of asymmetric information 
(adverse selection), the moral hazard, the post opportunism contract, the divergence of interests, 
negotiators limited rationality... present the source of power asymmetry between partners 
negotiators  of PPP contracts. 
 
Thus, according to (Gummesson, 1996), most of the negotiations took place in a situation 
of power asymmetry, and even if the symmetry is desirable for the partners, it is difficult to 
maintain (Yovovich 1991). The asymmetry of power, which is the difference between the power 
held by each party, has a crucial influence on the negotiation process (Kim, (2000); Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp (1998), Lawler (1986) ; Dwyer and Walker, (1981); and Bacharach 
Lawler, (1981)). According to (Bacharach and Lawler (1981)), though the importance of the 
power asymmetry in a trade negotiation has already been well studied, the role of its perception 
(perception of differential power) is still largely unknown and deserves to be analyzed for its 
impact on the negotiation of PPP contracts. 
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Thus, in this general context we develop our paper which will try to answer the following 
question: what is the effect of power asymmetry on PPP contracts negotiation? Specifically, our 
research examines the impact of perceived power differential on the strategies and the results of 
negotiations in a situation of power asymmetry between public and private parties. This research 
aims to better understand and detect the issues of negotiation process taking place between high 
and low power part. 
Through this research, we will be able to determine the selection criteria for public and 
private negotiators and formalize the logic of negotiations in a situation of power asymmetry. We 
first present the theoretical foundations of the research. Then we propose a set of hypotheses 
about the negotiation process in a situation of power asymmetry. 
 
3. Basic concepts: PPP, negotiation and asymmetry 
To better conduct the rest of work, it should, first, to define the key concepts inherent in 
this research, mainly the PPP, negotiation and asymmetry of power. 
a. The PPP :  
According to Hall (2015), a public private partnership PPP is a contract between the 
government and a private company by which the private company finances, builds and operates 
some elements of a public service. Then it will be paid over several years, either through fees 
paid by the users (we often talk about concession) or through payments paid by the public 
authority, or a combination of both. 
For further details, according to Ruegg, Decoutere and Mettan (1994), the PPP term 
involves process where the public and private sectors have to work together to research, develop 
and especially implement solutions that would not have reasons to be or likely to exist or, more 
simply, that does not present the same quality, whether the public sector and the private sector 
were confined in a solitary way. Thus, the PPP can be implemented through a contractual 
agreement between public and private partners, which stipulates the setting of mutual results and 
targets for improving the delivery of public services. This agreement establishes a real sharing of 
responsibilities, investments, risks and benefits so as to provide mutual benefits that promote the 
achievement of results. 
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According to Belhocine and Mazouz (2005), the PPP suppose the signing of a contract 
which is, as defined in the ordinance of June 17, 2004, included in Article L. 1414-1 of the 
General Code of local collectivity (CGCL ), "an administrative contract by which the public body 
entrusts a third party for a determined period, based on the amortization period for investments or 
the financing arrangements chosen, a global mission relative to the financing of immaterial 
investments, structure or equipment necessary to the construction or the transformation of 
structures and equipment, and to their maintenance, exploitation or management and, where 
appropriate, to other services contributing to exercise, by the public entity, the public service 
mission which it is charged. 
However, according to Beaussée and Gonnet (2012), PPP contracts are not subject to 
strict legal definition. The Green Paper of the European Commission (30 April 2004) defines four 
basic criteria qualifying the PPP contracts: 
 
- The relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation between the 
public partner and the private partner on different aspects of a project to be realized; 
-  Project financing mode, ensured in part by the private sector, sometimes through a 
complex financial arrangement between the various actors, the public financing may be 
added to the private financing; 
-  The important role of the economic operator, who participates at different stages of the 
project (design, realization, implementation, financing), the public partner focus 
essentially on defining the objectives to be attained in terms of the public interest, the 
quality of offered services, the price policies, and ensuring the control of compliance with 
these objectives; 
-  The allocation of risks between the public partner and the private partner based on the 
respective capacities of the parties concerned to assess, control and manage them. 
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b. The negotiation: 
According to Alaoui (2004) Negotiating is the art of dialogue and to discover what the 
partner search in order to reach a common interest agreement. To achieve this goal, we must 
choose a communication type and a type of negotiation. In its commercial vocation, negotiation 
arises, according to the same author, as a communication approach in which the parties 
concerned seek an agreement by mutual concessions to reach a common goal: buying for one 
party and selling for the other. 
Thus, commercial negotiation is intended as one of the major determinants of firm 
performance (Anderson and Weitz (1989) and Lax Sebenius, (1995)). According to Bagozzi 
(1975), negotiation is based on the exchange between the Parties and constitutes one of the key 
concepts of all marketing approach as long as it affects the nature of the relationships between 
sellers and buyers. According to Guicherd et al (2014), the nature of relationships allows to 
distinguish the "classic" commercial sale in which conditions are set by the seller (the buyer 
cannot discuss these conditions), from commercial negotiations during which held a discussion 
on commercial terms. 
 However, it must be said that the negotiation needs a very particular strategy to achieve 
its goals. Indeed, the negotiating strategy is defined as the program, the game, the plan or the 
tactics used by negotiators to achieve their objectives (Putnam and Jones (1982)). It, therefore, 
varies according as it is integrative or distributive. An integrative strategy refers to negotiations in 
which the focus is on non-coercive tactics such as recommendations, requests or information 
exchanges. Distributive strategy refers to a negotiation that focuses on coercion such as the use of 
threats, promises and recourse to legal arguments (Frazier and Summers, 1986; Fisher and Ury, 
1981; Pruitt, 1981; Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). 
c. Power asymmetry : 
Power is often seen as a relationship between social actors (individuals, social groups or 
social classes). As stated by Max Weber (1922): "the power relationship is observed when an 
individual accomplishes (or fails to accomplish) in accordance with the desire of another 
individual, an action he would not have accomplished (or have accomplished) spontaneously ". 
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However, according to Emerson (1962), Power is defined as the ability to evoke a change 
in another’s behavior. Also, Gaski and Nevin (1985) consider that the power refers to one’s 
ability to persuade someone else to do something he/she would not have otherwise done. 
Traditionally,  the  negotiation process  was  assumed  to  be  based  on the  nature  of  the  
interdependence  of  the  parties  interacting  (Cadotte  and  Stern,  1979; Rinehart and Page, 
1992). Each negotiator aims to influence the course of the relationship to  increase  their  relative  
benefit  from  the  negotiation  (Anderson  and  Narus,  1990).  A negotiator’s  power  is  crucial  
to  his/her  degree  of success,  because  it  influences  the allocation of rewards in an agreement 
(Kim, 1997; Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 2005).  
According to Guicherd (2014), power is influenced by the context in which companies 
and negotiators evolve (competitive situation, reputation, expertise, trust). Understanding power 
positions of negotiators is essential in comprehending the negotiation process. Power is perceived 
and some negotiators are more sensitive to it than other. When the power is erroneously 
evaluated, the high power party may underestimate its power and overestimate the power of the 
other party. Meanwhile, the low power party may overestimate its own power or underestimate 
the power of the high power party. Thus, negotiation strategies and the results depend on how 
power is perceived, exercised and accepted by the negotiators. 
The concept of asymmetry of power in negotiations has always attracted the interest of 
researchers in negotiation. According to the theorists of negotiation, power appears in the 
negotiation process and enables changing the behavior of the other by influencing its values, 
preferences and its interests in the desired direction (Kremenyuk and Sjöstedt and Zartman 
(2000)). 
Thus, after having introduced the key concepts of this research, we will present a 
literature review examining the various previous studies that treated the above notions.  
2. Literature review:  
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After defining the PPP concept, we will present the studies that treated the problematic 
related to the concept of PPP. Thus, without being exhaustive, we can say, according to Perrier et 
al. (2014), that the literature review related to the public-private partnership concept is focused 
mainly on eight principal themes. 
The first theme focuses on risk assessment and cost of a PPP project. Indeed, studies have 
attempted to count the risks faced by a PPP project and their apportionment between the public 
entity and the private operator (Li et al. (2002), Grimsey and Lewis (2002 -2005), Jin and Doloi, 
(2008), Satish and Shah (2009), yuan et al. (2009), Pindzo, (2010), Rebeiz (2011), Ke et al., 
(2011), Regan et al., (2011 ), Hwang et al. (2013)). 
The second theme has examined the PPP and sector studies in which the authors tried to 
study their effects on topics sectors partnerships (the field of public health, infrastructure, 
transportation, mining, the agriculture, etc.). An illustration, we can cite the work of Widdus 
(2005), Hodge and Greve (2009), imparato (2010), Lousberg (2011), Tang (2011), of pinho 
campos et al. (2011), Agyemang (2011) and macartney and Poulton (2012). 
The third theme, tried to analyze the different models and methods which have been 
developed to formalize, analyze and estimate risks and results inherent in PPP projects. Studies 
made in this context have shown the importance and supremacy of game theory, property rights, 
positive agency theory, simulation and network theory as theories that explain and describe more 
the rationality of public and private actors acting within a PPP (Ho, Zitron (2006), Medda, Ng et 
al., (2007), Ke et al. (2008), Cheung and chan, Hui, Pantelias and Zhang, Takashima et al., 
Vasilescu et al. Yuan Skibniewski, Li and Zheng (2010), chowdhury et al. (2011)). 
The fourth theme dealt with the main PPP case studies that took place in different 
countries and continents. Thus, we cite studies: Feres-Lewin (2000), Samii et al. (2002), Hurst 
and Reeves (2004), Essig and Batran (2005), Stainback and Donahue (2005), Beaulieuet and 
Nollet (2006), Abednego and Ogunlana (2006), Wettenhall (2007), Laishram and Kalidindi 
(2009) , Perié (2009), Resch (2009), Swain (2009), Jan et al. (2010), Lavlinskii (2010), Lee 
(2010), lo and Tang (2010), Wang et al. (2010), Martins et al. (2011). 
The fifth theme examined the multi-case studies in which comparative studies were made 
according to differentiated criteria (efficiency, risks, constraints, objectives etc.). For illustrative 
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and not exclusive we can refer to the work of Sharma (2007), Cohn (2008), and Collin Smith 
(2008), Sheung et al. (2009), Tynkkynenet Lehto (2009), De Jong et al. (2010), Dulaimi et al. 
(2010), Cheung and Chan (2011), Lee and Yu (2011), Marks and Berg (2011), Fallah-Fini et al. 
(2012) Perks (2012), Sharma and Cui (2012), Liu and Wilkinson (2013), Nsasira et al. (2013), 
Sovacool (2013) who tried to measure the performance of PPP projects based on simultaneous 
comparative studies. 
The sixth theme, which was interested in legal and governmental issues, tried to expose 
the PPP development strategies that provide partners with a regulatory, legal and institutional 
framework taking into account the interests of the partners and ensuring transparency in the 
contract (and Essaouabi Khalifa (2003), Sahooly (2003), Koch and Buser (2006), and Medda 
Galilea (2010), Verma (2010)). 
The seventh theme tried to find the PPP determinants of success by identifying the key 
and failure factors influencing the use of PPPs by proposing a management model and 
performance measurement (Weiermair et al. (2008), Aulich (2010), Wu (2010), Abdul-Aziz and 
Jahn Kassim (2011), Yuan et al. (2011), Ahmadjian and Collura (2012), Ashuri et al. (2012), 
Sharif (2012), Xu et al. (2012), Yuan et al. (2012), Nisar (2013)). 
The eighth theme covers the statistical analyzes that were developed in the PPP project 
and leading to results of some surveys made on the customer satisfaction in PPP context and 
proposing a prediction conflicts model between partners in a PPP project (Schobener et al. 
(2007), Jamali (2007), karl-Michalski et al. (2009), Rangel et al. (2012), Tang and Shen (2013)). 
 
Thus, we note that, despite the plurality and diversity of themes discussed, the literature 
review which examined the effect of the power asymmetry on negotiating public-private 
partnership contracts is relatively rare. This may be due to many reasons: The first is that the 
majority of the works done have a consequentialist character so that they were interested in the 
results of PPP regardless of the nature of the negotiations and the character of asymmetries that 
occurred and which may produce unjust and ineffective PPP. The second is that the study of 
power asymmetry in bargaining often has empirical problems in the evaluation of that asymmetry 
and the revelation of its existence.  
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However, few studies have attempted to converge to our problematic what we will try to 
present in the following. Glumac et al (2015) attempted to examine the behavior and interaction 
that can take place between the public partner (the municipality) and the private operator. The 
authors started from the hypothesis of the divergence and asymmetry of interests that may occur 
between the two partners. The authors assumed that these asymmetries are the result of 
asymmetries in negotiations concerning the formation of a public-private partnership. to detect 
theses asymmetries, the authors used a survey to collect the necessary data that were used to 
estimate the variation in gains between the two parties in the negotiating games mentioned. 
Baarveld et al (2015) assume that negotiation is an inevitable approach when planning 
partnership projects in the field of urban redevelopment.  Insight into the negotiation process 
contributes to current planning practice as negotiation provides a strong basis for addressing 
conflicts and satisfying both individual and common interests. In this paper the concepts of 
integrative and distributive negotiation are explored and analyzed in two urban redevelopment 
projects involving cultural heritage buildings in the Netherlands. The paper shows the negotiation 
dynamics over time and argues that openly formulating joint ambitions and making strong 
statements to fulfill individual interests are both essential in coming to a mutually beneficial 
agreement. 
Marcus and Bowles (2004) had shown that despite the growing popularity of the use of 
public-private partnership concept as a strategic market, it is often noticed the existence of many 
problems related to different stages underlying the PPP process. It is indeed high transaction costs 
( call for offers, contract and pre-contract costs and time exceedances are mainly due to the nature 
relatively long of negotiations process). The empirical research, conducted by the 
abovementioned authors, in the UK focused on the extent and the intensity of these pre-
contractual time and cost overruns. The authors also showed that the efficiency of PPP depends 
on several variables including the nature of the project, the role of the public sector in the control 
and regulation of the project and the financial power of the private partner which may influence 
contract terms during negotiations. However, the authors noted that the financial capacity of the 
public sector has no significant influence on the award of the contract to the private sector which 
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means that the power asymmetry in negotiation makes the dominant party (private operator) tries 
to turn contract terms in its favor so that to maximize its expected actual earnings of the project. 
Medda (2007) has developed a model based on the game theory to analyze the negotiation 
process and the allocation of risks between the private sectors in the transport infrastructure 
projects in PPP context. The results show that, in the case when the guarantee value is higher than 
the financial loss linked to the risks covered by the guarantees, regulation is recommended, rather 
than an arbitration agreement, to avoid ethical problems. 
 
Moreover, Ho (2006) examined how governments and project promoters can act in 
various situations of renegotiation when PPP project is in trouble by analyzing the impact of the 
rescue measures taken by governments on the management projects. The author has developed a 
renegotiation model based on the game theory from which establishes the guidelines and 
administrative policies that can better manage and reduce problems in the renegotiation of PPP 
projects. For example, during the implementation of projects, the government should recognize 
the possibility of opportunism and have a reasonable doubt on the proposal provided by the 
proponent. 
After presenting the literature review on the negotiation of PPP contracts, we will, in the 
following, focus on the commercial negotiation research that has treated the issue of power 
asymmetries between the co-contracting parties, and its effect on the progress of negotiation. 
Dwyer and Walker (1981) and Rinehart and Page (1992) emphasize that the interest of studying 
negotiation from a Source/Target perspective lies in the fact that it represents the power position 
of the negotiators, and brings new insight to the negotiation process compared to the regular 
Buyer/Seller perspective. The term “Target” refers to the negotiator in a low-power position, and 
“Source” to the negotiator in a high-power position. Source/Target is more pertinent than 
buyer/seller as terminology in the study of negotiation processes in asymmetrical power 
situations.  
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Recently, Kim, Pinkley and Fragale (2005) have questioned and debated power in 
negotiations. They offered a new theoretical framework distinguishing between the power of each 
negotiator, and emphasizing power interactions at each step of the negotiation process.  
Moreover, Prefetch and Landau (2000), focused on the properties of symmetry and 
asymmetry between trading partners and their relative influences on the process and results of 
negotiation. First, they describe the potential relative power and strength of negotiating parties 
and they don’t just indicate the differences and similarities between the negotiating partners, but 
also they determine the eventual negotiation process. Second, while asymmetric parties seek to 
reach a consensus in the negotiating process by introducing a third person (who commits to 
mediate the negotiation process). Third demonstration, concerns the symmetry of the instruments 
used in negotiation. Finally, the outcome of the negotiating process expressed utilities 
perceptions for both parties. Therefore, the symmetry / asymmetry may exist in all stages of the 
negotiation process. 
We notice by the above that the majority of PPP studies and negotiation research did not 
give particular importance to the effect of the power asymmetry in the negotiation of PPP 
contracts. This research will aim to verify, in the context of PPP, the relationship between the 
power asymmetry and negotiation. To conduct this research, we will be inspired by the model of 
Guicherd et al. (2014) which connects the power asymmetry, with negotiation strategies and 
individual gain. Thus, we will adopt this model and test its hypotheses in the negotiating 
framework of PPP contracts. 
4. The research hypotheses: 
From the conceptual frameworks, on the power dynamic (Kim et al (2005)) and the power 
asymmetry (Dwyer and Walker (1981) and Rinehart and Page (1992)), we propose to study 
simultaneously the negotiation process from the source (the strongest power party) and the target 
(the lowest power party). Although, the model of Kim, Pinkley and Fragile (2005) on the 
dynamics of power has not been validated by empirical research, it has the advantage of studying 
the different stages of negotiation process simultaneously (for the target and the source) instead 
of studying separately the source on one side and on the target on the other side. The strength and 
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interest of this model lie in the fact that it takes into account the complexity of the negotiation 
process on both sides of the negotiation simultaneously. 
Thus, we expect that using this model in the power asymmetric situations (with a source-
target approach) might explain more the respective influence of perceived power differential 
between source and the target. 
On these theoretical foundations, we propose to establish a model built around a three 
steps negotiation process: the pre-negotiation stage, which corresponds, ex-ante, to the evaluation 
by each negotiator of the differential of perceived power. The second step is dependent on the 
first and concerns the way in which the negotiation was conducted. In other words, the main 
matter in this step is the negotiating strategies implemented during the interaction between the 
different actors. Negotiation strategy refers to integrative or distributive Source and Target 
reaction behaviors. The third step, which is dependent to the two first, concerns the outcome of 
the negotiations, also called "realized power" by Kim, and Pinkley Fragale (2005), corresponding 
to the results of the negotiations. These are represented by the individual gains of the source and 
the target. Based on this model, we will expose a set of assumptions which we will try to test and 
validate.   
a. Perceived power differential and the negotiation strategy 
The trading strategy in general, is influenced by the perceived power differential between 
negotiators (Zartman and Rubin (2002); Rokkan and Haugland (2002); Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (1998)). In a PPP negotiation, each party, to assess the respective powers of the 
negotiators, takes into account information it has on its own power level (its competitivity level, 
market positioning etc.). Several studies (Hornstein (1965); Michener and Cohen (1973); Dwyer 
and Walker (1981)) show that in a context of asymmetrical power, the source is more likely to 
use threat tactics than the target. Schurr and Ozanne (1985) show that source prefers the 
distributive strategy when it expects difficult negotiations. 
 However, the target opts for an integrative strategy to avoid that the other party requests 
more, or hardens its requirements. In this case of partnership, the conflict is costly in terms of 
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time and money and may end with the breaking of relations between parties. In practice, several 
cases describe this situation for example we can cite the case of the PPP negotiation for the 
development of the Nefidha-Monastir airport. We therefore propose the following assumptions: 
 
H1a:  More than the perceived power differential of the Source party (assumed as having the 
highest power) is favorable, the less he/she will use an integrative strategy during the negotiation.  
H1b: As much as the perceived power differential of the Target is unfavorable ( party having the 
lowest power), as much as  he/she will use an integrative strategy during the negotiation.  
 
b. Perceived Power Differential and Negotiation Outcomes  
The results of the negotiation reflect the power realization (Kim, Pinkley and Fragale, 
(2005)) and can be measured by gains negotiators from this partnership (Clopton, (1984); Dwyer 
and Walker (1981); Graham, (1983)). In Management field, the individual gains were often used 
as bargaining outcomes (Clopton, (1984); Dwyer and Walker (1981), Graham (1983)). However, 
it was shown that the degree of the existing power asymmetry between the parties influences the 
results of trading (Zartman and Rubin (2002)). According to Dunbar (2004), the perception of 
owning of power leads to a great influence on the negotiation results.  
 
The perception by the negotiators of their own contribution to the wealth creation, allow 
them to set their targets. For example in public-private partnership, the party which perceives as 
producing two-thirds of the wealth will tend to place the breaking point at this level and seeks 
often more in terms of earnings. The theory of negotiation (Fisher and Ury (1982)) is based on 
the precise analysis of this breaking point, referred to as the Best Alternative to Non-Agreement. 
When the opposite party has an advantage, the low power part must determine the level of 
minimum gain it accepts to avoid engaging in a worse position than a lack of agreement. Some 
authors have also shown that the results tend to match the prior objectives of the negotiators 
(Huber and Neale (1986); McAlister, Bazerman and Fader (1986)). The difference between the 
individual earnings of the negotiators is assumed to be proportional to their perceived power 
differential. This allows us to establish the following assumptions: 
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H2a: More than the perceived power differential of the Source party (assumed as having the highest 
power) is favorable, the greater his/her individual gains are highest.  
H2b: As much as the perceived power differential of the Target is unfavorable ( party having the lowest 
power), as much as his/her individual gains are lowest. 
c. Source and target negotiation Strategies 
Negotiators with a strong power (sources) can choose their strategy ((Kim and Pinkley 
Fragale, (2005); Dwyer and Walker (1981); and Page Rinehart, (1992)). Thanks to their weak 
stakes and independence, Sources do not fear the consequences of their interlocutors’ reactions, 
despite the risk of dissolution of the partnership (Dunbar, 2004). So, the source, certain of its 
power, can exert pressure on its partner. Dwyer and Walker (1981) and Cook and Emerson 
(1978) show that power asymmetry leads to an asymmetry in the negotiation which is then 
dominated by the person who has a higher power (source). The source will have a greater 
capacity to impose its strategy, while the target will tend to match that of his partner. In fact, 
when the source adopts an integrative or distributive strategy, it is very difficult for the target to 
use a different strategy because of its dependence in partnership with the source. This means that 
the target must follow the same strategy as the source in order to preserve its interests. So we can 
consider the following hypothesis: 
H3: As much as more the source strategy is integrative and distributive more than the target 
strategy is integrative and distributive.  
d. Negotiation strategy and  individual gains 
 
The performance of a negotiation can be analyzed in different ways: by the quality of 
relations between the partners, the manner of sharing of risks, the evaluation of individual 
earnings and the valuation of collective gains. As we are separately investigating Source and 
Target negotiators, we have selected individual gains. Of course, joint gains analysis could be 
also interesting and might be a potential avenue for future research. 
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Concerning individual earnings, Adler, Graham and Schwarz (1987) show that the 
negotiators get higher profits when using distributive negotition strategy. Indded, the negotiators 
who opt for a distributive strategy should therefore get higher individual earnings if they use an 
integrative strategy. So we postulate: 
 
H4a: more the strategy of the Source is integrative (the highest power party), more less his/her 
individual gains. 
H4b:  more the strategy of the target is integrative (the lowest power party), more less  his/her 
individual gains.  
A negotiator should also make strategic decisions that are more or less favorable to the 
other party. In practice, however, friendly attitudes and cooperative behavior from a negotiator 
can ultimately reduce his/her power as perceived by the other party, thus increasing opportunistic 
behaviors and the possibility of individual gains for the other party (Guicherd et al.,(2014)) . 
Neale, Northcraft and Huber (1987) show that framing bias influences the negotiation 
results. Other research has focused on the influence of the requested task (Bazerman, Magliozzi 
and Neale (1985); Eliashberget al, (1986)). The perceived power is another source of framing 
bias. The prediction is that the negotiator who has a positive frame (expertise and domain 
knowledge, access to information,…) should be a risks averse (the highest power party) while 
that which has a negative frame should have a tendency to take more risks (the lowest power 
party) (Neale, Huber and Northcraft, (1987)). Negotiators who have a negative frame should be 
more efficient in terms of individual earnings than those with a positive frame (Thompson, 1990). 
Thus: 
H5a: more the source strategy is integrative (the highest power party), more than the individual gains of 
the Target are highest.  
H5b: more the target strategy is integrative more are the individual gains of the Source.  
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e. The source and target gains 
Although the partners interests are not systematically opposed (Thompson, 1995), they 
diverge necessarily on various points including the distribution of earnings. In practice, there are 
some domains where the benefits of a party cannot occur only on the detriment of the other party. 
While the partnership is built with more or less success in the situations winner / winner 
(Rinehart and Page, 1992), a punctual situation is more likely to be built in the situations loser / 
winner (Dwyer and Walker, 1981). Dwyer and Walker (1981) have stated that "in situations of 
asymmetrical power, the Strong negotiator gets a favorable deal at the expense of overall profits 
for all partners: This means that the negotiator who has the strong power can maximizes 
individual earnings instead of joint gains. Furthermore, Gaski (1984, 1986) shows that source 
gets higher gains than the target negotiator. Therefore, the individual gains will be negatively 
correlated with those of the source and those of the target. So we postulate: 
H6: As much as the individual gains of the Source are high as much as the individual gains of the 
Target are low 
Thus, we summarize the Assumptions of this research in The Following conceptual model: 
 the source The target 
 
 
Negotiation determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiation strategies 
 
Negotiation result 
Negotiation Process in situation of power asymmetry  
Source: According to the work of Dwyer and Walker, 1981 
H5b+ H5a+ 
The perceived power 
differential of the 
Source 
The perceived power 
differential of the  
Target 
Source Strategy Target Strategy 
 
Source Individual 
Gain  
Target Individual 
Gain  
H2a + H1a - H1b - H2b + 
H3 + 
H4a - H4b - 
H6 - 
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Conclusion 
As a conclusion we can say that this work had allows us to determine the main variables which 
govern the public-private partnership. Indeed, in the context of this PPP we have noted that is 
exists a game type (principal/agent) and a succession of negotiations established between them 
and which can leads, probably, to some money transfers (from the weak party to the strong one).   
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